2-5人外星人房- Corner Backpacker 台中背包旅店 婕西在過年前終於將4樓的團體房整裡出來,內有大型外星人壁畫,讓團體可以在壁畫前一起合影紀念 關鍵字排名,也感謝二姐來協助婕西的壁畫上色 這間房是專門為 景觀設計團體或家庭 設計,有4個單人床,可以外加1張摺疊床墊,所以最多可以睡到 代償5人。然後婕西有準備外星人偶,撲克牌和疊疊樂供團體能夠一起玩樂。 因為才剛開放,連網路上相片 租房子和資料都還沒放,在過年期間就已經被許多團體訂滿,每一個團體一進入房間就是驚喜的驚呼"哇!" ,相信大家很滿意婕西的佈 澎湖民宿置,這樣婕西的心血就無白費了 有機會一起邀約三五好友一同來台中體驗一下外星人房吧!! Corner Backpacker 背包旅店 新推出~ Alien Mix Gr 住商房屋oup Room外星人4人男女混合房(供團體預訂,最多可以加1張床) 周日到周四每晚2000元,周五和周六每晚2100元。 加摺疊床,一張500元,最多加1張,一間房最多可以睡5人。 酒店打工 特色: 1.近SOGO/勤美誠品百貨和台中科博館。 2.附近有國光和統聯巴士站。 3.附近有計程車招呼站和公車站,交通十分便利。 4.房間內有大型外星人壁畫,提供撲克牌和疊疊樂。 5.每 土地買賣單人床都附有床包,枕頭,枕頭套及保暖毯子。 6.浴室附洗髮精和沐浴乳,房間內有吹風機。 附近有投幣洗衣店,便利商店,市場,早餐店,Bar等。可租台單車暢遊台中市(美術館和五權西4街綠園道,科博館,精明一街?建築設計A民俗公園,中友百貨商圈,新光三越商圈等等) 入房時間:下午2點~11點,退房中午12點 歡迎光臨!! 相關訂房資訊請上官網: Corner Backpacker 背包旅店 台中便宜住宿.背包客最佳選擇 恕不接受所有的口頭訂房! 床位保留以先匯款者優 室內裝潢先保留!  .

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          【星座解析】★∮十二星座外表成熟、內心幼稚的男生∮★ (參考太陽跟月亮)第一名:牡羊男牡羊男外表成熟,做起事來非常有規劃,可是牡羊男的人生有上下班之分?居酒屋A上班的時候很嚴肅、很專業,下班之後就是一個白痴,生活無法自理,應?租辦公室鴾ㄢq順,生活作息需要別人幫忙,是一個不折不扣的大孩子。而且他永遠單向思考,永遠都會 酒店打工為很簡單的事情而開心。第二名:巨蟹男巨蟹男的幼稚程度要看跟對方熟與不熟,如果跟對方不熟,就會裝老成,一定不?網路行銷|讓人覺得他很幼稚;但是跟他熟了之後,本性就會流露出來了。這跟巨蟹男覺得環境安不安全有關,當覺得這個環境對他是友善的,就可以放心了, 房屋二胎本性就可以表現出來,開始講笑話、依賴性...等等就出來了。第三名:天蠍男天蠍男永遠停留在青少年時期,愛玩、愛作弄別人,喜歡吸引別人注意,很像青少年時期的 信用貸款小孩,喜歡參加舞會派對,希望女生可以多看他一眼。等他長大、成熟了,就用事業成功來吸引異性,天蠍男就像小孩一樣,需要別人的讚美及肯定。第四名:魔羯男魔羯男的人生是倒著過的,年輕?酒店兼職漁伬圇O老成的,到了年紀越大就越想過沒有經歷過的青少年時期。魔羯男的幼稚是屬於青少年時期,當看到一大堆朋友時,就會很開心,曲終人散的時候,就會很失落。其實在這群朋友中,他也沒有做什麼,可是就會 情趣用品覺得這種場面人真多、真開心、真好,就是想把往日跟大家同樂的感覺找回來。第五名:雙子男雙子男做事還蠻有分寸,跟人家交往時,看起來老氣橫秋,一副少年老成的樣子,可事實上雙子男的幼稚是停留在幼年時期。雙子男之所以會陰晴不定 有巢氏房屋,是因為受了委屈,受了委屈之後就會想哭,可是會告訴自己男生不能哭,於是就會哭喪著臉,在他的內心裡,永遠有一個羞怯的男孩。 .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 酒店兼職  .

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          智邦業務副總離職感言 轉PO~勵志文章 智邦業務副總離職感言 親愛的業務處同仁: 雖然我用宇宙原則──沒有恆常來安慰我自己, 但是我還是覺得心裡好痛。實在是捨不下每日走進office看見你們充滿快樂前景笑容時的感受‧對於共事時光較長的同事,虔心希望你們能再激勵自己,更上一層樓‧至於相處時間較短的新夥伴們,請接受我一聲真心的抱歉,沒能有更長時間來互相勉勵‧以下面的小文章來和大家 房地產分享。 快樂不是自來水。有一次我以「快樂」為題演講。事後,聽眾中有位女士站起來說:「要是我丈夫也來聽就好了。」她說她深愛丈夫,但丈夫老是很不快樂,和她一起生活著實不容易。這位女士的話,讓我想到道理應該是這麼講的:為己為人,要把尋覓快樂當一回事‧我告訴她,為了我們的配偶、我們的子女 景觀設計、朋友,我們要儘量快樂。你若不相信我的話,不妨去問問,孩子跟不快樂的父母長大是什麼滋味;或者問問做父母的,如果他們有一個不快樂的孩子有多痛苦。 我的童年生活並不特別快樂,而且跟大多數少年人一樣,沉溺在自己以為的痛苦中‧但有一天我忽然醒悟,其實我是在畏難而取易‧要悶悶不樂並不難;那種事不需花心思力氣‧真 會場佈置正的成就在於盡所能以求快樂。很多人想都沒想過:快樂是必須去求、去找,才會有的。我們都以為快樂只是一種「感覺」,源自碰巧發生在我們身上的好事,而那種好事會不會發生,則非我們所能主宰。但真相剛好相反。快樂主要是由我們支配的,我們應該主動爭取,而非被動等待。  快樂的三個障礙 要有快樂人生,就要克服一些障礙,其中三個障礙是 太平洋房屋:  與別人比較 多數人都拿自己跟我們以為人生順利的人比較:有些是親友,有些是我們其實認識很淺的人。 有一次我認識一個年輕人,看來就是人生有成,日子過得開心那種人‧他談起他摯愛的妻女,談起他在他中意的城市當電台節目主持人,喜不自勝。我記得當時我心裡想的是:這傢伙就是那種事事順遂的少數幸運兒。接著我們談起電腦的互聯網‧他告訴我,他感激這世界上 有巢氏房屋有互聯網,因為他可以從中查索關於多發性硬化症的資料‧‧‧‧‧‧他妻子正在飽受此症煎熬。我先前以為他人生沒有任何不順遂的事,此時只覺自己愚不可及。 侷限於「完美」 幾乎每個人都有想像中完美的生活‧問題當然是很少有人事業與家庭都合乎他們自己想像中的標準。我個人就是個例子,我出生的家庭沒有人離過婚,在我看來婚姻是一生一世的事。因此我和第一任妻子在結婚五年,兒子出世三年後 小型辦公室離異時,我整個人垮掉了。我覺得自己是個窩囊廢後來我再婚,婚後向妻子芬妮坦認擺脫不了自覺家庭生活失敗的心頭陰影。她問我現在這個家有什麼不妥 ( 這時我們的家包括我的兒子和她與前夫生的女兒 )。我說,除了與兒子在一起的時間太少之外(我與前妻共同擁有撫養權),現在這一家人倒幸福的很。"那麼你為什麼不因此而開心生活?”她問。理當如此。但首先我必須擺脫「完美」家庭的假象。 過份注意缺憾 破壞快樂 小型辦公室的有效方法,莫過於對任何事物只集中注意「瑕疵」。例如望向天花板時,只盯著缺了塊鋪板的那處地方。正如有個禿子對我說的:「每次我走進人多的房間,只會注意到人家沒有一個是禿頭。」一旦你找出自己缺了哪一塊鋪板,就要探討:若重新取得這塊鋪板,是否真的可以使你快樂?然後你有三個行動選擇:去找到這塊鋪板,或用另一塊不同的餔板鋪上。又,或者根本不予理會,把注意力放在你生命中沒掉的鋪板上。  快樂的三道秘方 我多年來研究快樂的道 裝潢理,得到最重要結論之一是:人的一生遭遇,和他會多快樂並無太大關連。稍加細想就明白,這道理很明顯。我們都認識一些人,生活頗為順利,但從根本上來說不快樂;我們也知道有些人吃過不少苦頭。卻能樂天知命處世。  第一道秘方是感激── 快樂的人都有感激之心,無感激之心的人不會快樂。我們總以為人是因為不快樂才「抱怨」,其實「抱怨」可致人不快樂的說法,更有道理。  第二,要知道快樂是另一件事情的副產品── 最明顯的快樂泉源是:各種使我們生活 室內裝潢有目標的活動。例如研究昆蟲或打球。你越投入你所喜愛的活動,越可體驗更多快樂。 最後,應有如下的信念:這世界上有些永恆的事物是超越我們的,而且我們的生存有更重大的意義。這信念會使我們更快樂。我們需要精神上或宗教上信仰,或者秉持自己的人生觀。 無論你的人生觀是什麼,都該包含這個道理:如果你凡事都從好的方面看,對人生一定有好處。如果你總是從壞處想,日子就難過了。就如你想不想開心日子一樣,這事完全在於你的態度。很多人想都沒想過,快樂是必須去求、去找才會有?買房子滿C  .

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          小小發財夢 這期大樂?酒店工作/a>px">暴力虐待變態</ 明星情色小說span>z已連摃了N期,頭彩獎金高達6億,人 房屋貸款人都想中頭彩,我也不例外,和媽媽到了彩券行,買了100元電腦選號,希望今 系統傢俱晚億萬富翁就是我喔! 如果中了頭彩,我的奶粉 房屋買賣錢~尿布錢~學費~也都不用媽咪爹地操心了! 如果中了頭彩,還要幫拔?西裝外套瑋糧織咫j房子,還要去環遊世界ㄛ! 如果中了頭彩,別忘了也要做善事ㄛ! 新成屋 結果開出~2~3~10~21~25~34~,當晚果真又誕生了3位億萬富翁,雖然我沒有中頭彩,但是中了400元,也幫媽咪賺到一包尿布耶!也算是小小的收穫喔 術後面膜!  .

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          12月27日的食譜~~ 粗豆醬燒赤?魚 柯俊年-粗豆醬燒赤?魚 材料: 赤?魚3尾  蔥3根  薑30克 調味料: 粗豆醬3大匙 糖 襯衫1大匙 醬油1大匙 味霖2大匙 酒2大匙 做法: 室內設計 1. 將赤?魚兩面各劃一刀至中骨處,薑切絲,蔥切絲備用 2. 取一個碗 燒烤,倒入粗豆醬、醬油、味霖、酒和糖調拌均勻成為調味醬備用 3. 鍋中燒熱2大匙油,先放入赤 買屋網 ?魚以大火將兩面煎至微焦,再轉小火加入調味醬,並倒入水至淹蓋過食材後,轉大火煮至湯汁濃稠,再放入薑絲和蔥絲拌?票貼N均勻即可完成 程安琪-味噌肉絲 材料: 肉絲150克  茭白筍4支  乾木耳1小撮 蔥1支  太白粉1小匙 調味料: 醬油1小 關鍵字廣告匙 味噌2小匙 味霖半大匙  麻油數滴 做法: 1. 肉絲加入醬油和1-2大匙的水拌至吸收,再加入太白粉拌勻後略微醃放備用 2. 乾木耳泡開後摘好並切絲,茭白?買屋咫蟋楚A蔥切段備用 3. 取一個碗,倒入味噌和4大匙的水調勻,再加入味霖和麻油拌勻成為味噌醬汁備用 4. 鍋中倒入4-5大匙的油燒至6-7分熱,放入肉絲炒至9分熟後,先盛出備用 5. 接著將 信用卡代償餘油倒出只留下1大匙油,先放入蔥段和茭白筍拌炒,再放入木耳略微炒一下後,加入少許水炒熱,再淋下味噌醬汁炒至茭白筍略微變軟,然後放回肉絲炒勻即可完成 李明芳-雙芋燉肉 材料: 芋頭600克  馬鈴薯30 酒店工作0克  里肌肉300克  蒜頭5顆 調味料: 醬油3大匙 味霖2大匙 做法: 1. 芋頭切塊,馬鈴薯切塊備用 2. 鍋中倒入芋頭塊、馬鈴薯塊、蒜頭、里肌肉片、醬油、味霖和4碗水開火煮滾後,再轉小火繼續燉煮至熟透鬆軟即可完成 租房子  .

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          耳鳴還怪鄰居吵 男子錄音告上法庭 更新日期:2009/07/04 12:23 社會中心/綜合報導 高雄市一名吳姓男子因為罹?酒肉朋友w主觀性耳鳴,會常自覺聽?室內裝潢鴗ㄘ瑭n音,但其實都是耳鳴在做怪,根本沒 好房網有任何聲音,他卻怪罪是隔壁鄰居在深夜製造噪音,害他睡不著,甚?591亃惕i對方。而對方在當了40年的鄰居後,如今卻要為莫須有的噪音挨告,讓他們相當無奈。 兩家 部落格鄰居住40年原本都相安無事,沒想到,從2年前開始,吳姓男子開始在房子中央砌牆,而且越築越高,他表示,都是因為林居老 部落格在深夜製造噪音,害他睡不著、受不了。鄰居無奈喊冤,明明沒有吵鬧卻還被錄音,甚至告上法庭。 結果,醫師證明吳姓男子是罹患主觀性耳鳴, 部落格症狀就是自覺聽到不明聲音,但旁人都無法聽到。鄰居表示,自從吳姓男子開始耳鳴後,還會拿雞蛋、碗盤等物品朝他們家門口砸,說是要抗議噪音,但他們只覺 烤肉食材得莫名其妙。 因為男子本身病狀,無辜挨告的鄰居只能忍受配合,不過,他提供的噪音證據,法官認為只有偶爾狗叫聲和車聲,最後都以不起訴結案。(新聞來源:東森新聞記者崔顯亞 西服) 取自>http://tw.news.yahoo.com/article/url/d/a/090704/17/1mftt.html .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 買屋網  .

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          繁華宇都宮 台女被迫賣淫 更新日期:2009/06/20 14:18 社會中心/綜合報導 台北市中山分局破獲竹聯幫玄武堂逼迫台灣女子到日本 情趣用品酒店賣淫,其中一名林小姐透過紙?買屋屭D救,在台日警方合作之下順利被救出火坑。這位林小姐被 會場佈置逼在宇都宮的「花之森」酒店工作。宇都宮被稱為「餃子之都」,45萬人口,到處都有居 房屋買賣酒屋,也是台灣觀光客經常到的地方,現在林小姐即將返台,對於脫離魔掌,心情平復很多。 來到熱鬧的宇都宮市 情趣用品,街道上商店林立,有餃子店、有居酒屋,裡頭還不乏有女陪侍的酒店。被賣到日本的林姓女子,就是在這種燈紅酒綠的地方工作,今 酒店打工年27歲的她家住在桃園,長相甜美,卻離鄉背井在日本宇都宮的花之森酒店賣淫,一年多來始終過著暗無天日的痛苦生活。 說起宇都宮市,台灣民眾對它或許並不陌?辦公室出租矷A宇都宮位於櫪木縣內,面積不大,人口也不多,但因為宇都宮是著名的「餃子之都」,也是「雷都」,距離東京約50分鐘的車程,是很多台灣遊客到東京會順道一遊的城市。 宇都?關鍵字排名c市的熱鬧繁華,讓台灣遊客慕名而來,卻也意外撿到林姓女子的求救紙條,寫著被囚禁的地點。或許是老天爺冥冥之中自有安排,台灣人救了台灣人,林姓女子結束賣淫苦日子,正準備回台灣重新開始。(新 燒烤聞來源:東森新聞) 取自>http://tw.news.yahoo.com/article/url/d/a/090620/17/1lme9.html .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 節能燈具  .

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          學生為獨居老人義剪 同獲心靈快樂 更新日期:2009/06/02 17:19 (中央社記者李錫璋台中市2日電)獨居老人需要關懷,年輕 景觀設計世代需要學習關懷,創世基 酒店兼職金會台中南屯天使站今天將二者結合,安排明德女中?裝潢肮倏W居老人修剪頭髮及指甲。學生與老人家都獲得心靈上的快樂。 南屯天?房地產炟蜓﹛A獨居老人平時較少出門及與人交往,生活欠缺變化與活力,長期關懷獨居老人的南屯天使站,每年 酒店經紀都會為獨居老人舉辦關懷活動,鼓舞老人家走出家門,增強健康與歡樂。 天使站今天特別協調明德女中學習美容、美髮的學生?土地買賣A為南屯地區的獨居老人免費修剪頭髮與指甲,藉此幫助學生學習社會關懷,同時磨練技術,而且也利用機會關懷獨居老人,讓老人家整修門面、神清氣爽, 建築設計並享受子孫關懷的人倫樂趣。 92歲的楊老太太說,學生們的剪髮手藝都不錯,讓她感覺精神大為提振,也在剪髮過程中,感受到學生們的細心與關懷,生活也因此增加不少的快?酒店兼職痋C 帶領學生為老人家修剪頭髮與指甲的明德女中童姓老師說,學生們都已學得不錯的修剪技術,幫老人家免費修剪正好可以磨練技巧,而且又有關懷弱勢的學習機會,對學生而言,是一個實習的大好機 襯衫會。980602 取自>http://tw.news.yahoo.com/article/url/d/a/090602/5/1kj8e.html .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 酒店經紀  .

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          洗錢案可能週三偵結 依貪污罪追加起訴扁珍 更新日期:2009/04/06 16:35 特偵組第二波偵辦陳水扁家族洗錢案,預計八號、週三偵查終?花蓮民宿 瓷A特偵組認為陳水扁、吳淑珍夫婦對於被指 房屋買賣控的犯行採不認罪態度,考慮不再就訊,可能直接依貪汙等罪嫌追加起 買屋網訴,再併案台北地院審理。不過特偵組發言人陳雲南不願證實確切追加起訴日,強調一切都依照?信用卡代償遛黺i度進行。(黃進恭報導) 陳水扁第二波洗錢疑案傳出可能在八號偵查終結,檢方可望結案部分包括前台北101董 澎湖民宿事長陳敏薰涉嫌以一千萬買官疑案,元大金控總經理馬維建、營運長馬維辰、前元大證券董事杜麗萍涉嫌行賄陳水扁家兩億元及代為處理五點七億?系統傢俱葬~匯款疑案還有前中信金控副董事長辜仲諒匯款陳水扁家三點四億元案;不過針對八號即將偵查終結,特偵組發言人陳雲南仍是不願透露相關細節,只強調一切都 澎湖民宿依照偵辦進度而定。 據了解相關案情中,陳敏薰涉案情節最為單純,馬維建、馬維辰兄弟和辜仲諒與陳水扁家複雜的金錢關係,則是最受外界囑目。另外依照特偵組分割偵結陳 面膜水扁案做法,扁案另有前兆豐金控董事長鄭深池、開發金控總經理辜仲瑩、前中鋼董事長林文淵等人分別被調查,相關案情也會由特偵組改組後由新的成員繼續負責偵辦,扁案確定將至少延燒到第三波。 取自>h 保濕面膜ttp://tw.news.yahoo.com/article/url/d/a/090406/1/1hcl0.html(此原出處網址已無效) .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 酒店打工  .

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          USPACOM Commander Willard’s interview by Asahi Shimbun●朝日新聞(2010.12.28) USPACOM Commander Willard’s interview by Asahi Shimbun●朝日新聞(2010.12.28) Question: What is your assessment of the current situation in the Korean Peninsula? Are the tense moments behind us? What kind of military posture and deployment do you maintain, and will there be any change because of the change of situation? Answer: As we both know, there was not a response from the North Koreans to the artillery exercise that was conducted by the Republic of Korea on Dec. 20. Given that the South Koreans had been attacked two times by North Korea, I thought Ambassador Susan Rice, our ambassador to the United Nations, put it very well when she said that to everyone it should be obvious why the Republic of Korea feels it necessary to maintain their military readiness through the exercise of their military forces. I think, for now, we're past this particular crisis, but we have no doubt, given North Korea's history, that a next provocation is readied. It's a matter of assessing how it might be deterred or how the North Koreans might be dissuaded from exercising the next provocation. We think the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance is part of that deterrence effort. We think the international community and China in particular are another part of it. Q: Looking at what happened in the Cheonan incident and also the recent shelling of the island, some people ask whether deterrence is effective and if it's working. Are the North Koreans deterred? A: There are various levels of deterrence. For 60 years, we've successfully deterred war on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S.-ROK alliance, 30,000 U.S. soldiers, the command structure, the advances in the Republic of Korea military, all of those things together have been a successful deterrent across the DMZ and have enabled us to maintain this armistice for many decades.That said, the other forms of deterrence, deterring their nuclear weapon advancements, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, our ability to deter that development has not been successful to date, and likewise, in this instance, our ability to deter a series of provocations has not been particularly successful. We don't know what we're able to prevent, given the closed nature of North Korea, but it shouldn't stop us from continuing to attempt to posture ourselves and to have the international community apply what levers they can to try and deter the next provocations. Q: In March, you told the Senate Armed Services Committee, "China's rapid and comprehensive transformation of its armed forces is affecting regional military balances." Could you elaborate on how China's military expansion is affecting the regional military balance? A: Two 褐藻醣膠 ways. In one sense, the tremendous advancement in China's military itself is shifting the overall balance of military powers in the region. It's been rare in history that any country underpinned by the kind of economic power that China possesses has developed its military so rapidly. But at the same time, the other countries in the Asia-Pacific region that are troubled by and uncertain of China's intentions are also advancing their own military capabilities, and this is particularly true in the acquisition of submarines and advanced aircraft. We're seeing not only China advance, but (also) the other militaries in the region that can afford it seek to advance alongside. Q: Do you think that kind of procurement, or arms race, is detrimental to stability? Or is it better to have other countries procure a certain level of weapon systems to balance out China's expansion? A: I think that's a very fair question. I think that the nations in the region have a responsibility to be able to maintain security within their territory, and not all of the nations in the Asia-Pacific are self-sufficient militarily. To an extent, the acquisition of systems (and) the advancement of our regional militaries will assist all of us in sharing the responsibility to maintain security across Asia-Pacific. To the extent the acquisitions are specifically to counter China or any other nation's growing military, it would raise the question whether or not those acquisitions are properly balanced to achieve self-sufficiency or whether it's targeted against counter-balancing other military powers. Q: Is the strategic balance in the region tipping toward China's favor because of its military expansion? A: Well, when you say "strategic balance," you and I would have to help define that because there's more to strategic balance than just a growing military. I would say that the military balance is undoubtedly shifting as China's military expands faster than other regional nations, but the strategic balance remains in flux. And again, there is an economic factor in that. There is a diplomatic factor in that. There is a military factor in that. (And) there is an economic factor associated with that. When we talk strategic balance, we have to talk about relative influence in the international community globally. China bears a responsibility, given its growing economic power, growing diplomatic power globally and growing military, to be a greater contributor to the overall security--of not only the Asia-Pacific but elsewhere--brought about by its many elements of national power. Japan and the United States, two longstanding economic powers, are good examples of nations 婚禮顧問 that have achieved a strategic balance in the world and are meeting many of their global responsibilities. Q: Let me go into China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. What is the current status of China's anti-ship ballistic missile development, and how close is it to actual operational deployment? A: The anti-ship ballistic missile system in China has undergone extensive testing. An analogy using a Western term would be "initial operational capability," whereby it has--I think China would perceive that it has--an operational capability now, but they continue to develop it. It will continue to undergo testing, I would imagine, for several more years. Q: China has achieved IOC? A: You would have to ask China that, but as we see the development of the system, their acknowledging the system in open press reporting and the continued testing of the system, I would gauge it as about the equivalent of a U.S. system that has achieved IOC. Q: Has China already perfected the technology to fly that missile and also the sensor systems for targeting? Has the entire system integration been completed? A: Typically, to have something that would be regarded as in its early operational stage would require that that system be able to accomplish its flight pattern as designed, by and large. Q: But they have not conducted the actual flight test or the test to attack moving ships yet, have they?A: We have not seen an over-water test of the entire system. Q: But do you believe they already have that capability?A: I think that the component parts of the anti-ship ballistic missile have been developed and tested. Q: Is it a bigger threat to the United States than submarines in terms of their A2/AD capabilities? A: No, I don't think so. Anti-access/area denial, which is a term that was relatively recently coined, is attempting to represent an entire range of capabilities and capacities that China has developed and that other countries have developed. It's not exclusively China that has what is now being referred to as A2/AD capability. But in China's case, it's a combination of integrated air defense systems, advanced naval systems such as the submarine, advanced ballistic missile systems such as the anti-ship ballistic missile, as well as power projection systems into the region. The anti-access/area denial systems, more or less, range countries, archipelagos such as Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam, so there are many countries in the region that are falling within the envelope of this, of an A2/AD capability of China. That should be concerning--and we know is concerning--to those countries.While it may be largely designed to assure China of its ability to a 開幕活動ffect military operations within its regional waters, it is an expanded capability that ranges beyond the first island chain and overlaps countries in the region. For that reason, it is concerning to Southeast Asia, (and) it remains concerning to the United States. Q: Do you think China already has the area denial capability inside of the first island chain? A: I think they are growing the capability inside of the first island chain. There is not one system that connotes an A2/AD capability. It's multiple systems. Some of those systems have the range capability to encompass the first island chain. Other aspects of A2/AD do not. To the extent that China is developing that capability, it is in development and advancing. I think that eventually, it's very likely that it will encompass what China is referring to as the "near seas," that extend to the first island chain. Q: What's the impact of China's growing A2/AD capabilities on the power projection capability of the United States? Is the U.S. power projection capability deteriorating because of China's A2/AD capability?A: No, I don't think so. Certainly, this kind of capability should be a concern to the region, and it poses a challenge to any naval or air operations that would be conducted in that area were it to be employed. Is it affecting my operations today? Not at all. Were it to pose a challenge to the United States, I'm confident that I have the capability to operate in that air space and water space. Q: It may have an impact on the U.S. power projection in the years to come, but at present, there is no impact at all, right? A: I would say that it's my responsibility to assure that the U.S. capabilities pace those kind of challenges, and we're endeavoring to do that. Q: In 1996, China launched missiles over Taiwan to influence its election; the United States sent two carrier battle groups close to Taiwan. Some experts say the United States cannot do that anymore unless you are ready to take a lot of risks because of China's A2/AD capabilities. Is it a fair statement to say you have to run much bigger risks to conduct the same kind of operations near Taiwan now compared with 1996? A: The anti-access/area denial capabilities, fully employed, will present a challenge to military operations in the region. That will have to be overcome. Q: The next topic is the collision off the Senkaku Islands. What should we read into the recent Senkaku incident between Japan and China in terms of China's maritime strategy or expansion?A: Clearly, China has articulated broad claims, both in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, and as a consequence of that, the Senkakus fall into (those) claims, as we all kn 房屋二胎ow, and remain a contested area between Japan and China. For the United States, we don't take sides in those contested claims areas but rather leave it to the claimants to solve the sovereignty issue between themselves. That said, in the case of the Senkakus, and regardless of the blame regarding the actual incident that occurred between the fisherman and the Japanese Coast Guard, China's subsequent actions were illustrative, both to Japan, to us in our observation, and to the region, regarding their willingness to be very assertive regarding those claims. From the detention of Japanese representatives that were in China to the suspension of rare earth mineral contracts, it was clear that China had intended to exert a number of levers in order to very strongly establish its position regarding the claim and the incident itself. At the end of the day, that was a signal to the region, and I think it was certainly eye-opening enough to raise concerns in ASEAN and in some of the dialogue that occurred subsequent to that. Q: Don't you think it backfired?A: In a way, yes. It appeared to be overplayed and, as a consequence, revealed a great deal to many of the countries, such as that they will be guarded regarding their exposure or their vulnerability to levers such as (the ones) China was exerting. Q: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the Senkakus fall within the scope of Article Five of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Don't you think it is necessary for Japan and the United States to work out a joint operation plan for contingencies and conduct a joint exercise based on that plan? A: First, Secretary Clinton was articulating a longstanding obligation that the United States has, so the fact that an administered set of islands falls under Article Five is not new. To the extent that Pacific Command is obligated to coordinate the defense of Japan with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and that the U.S. government and the Japanese government are obligated to come together in issues regarding defense of Japan, again (it) is longstanding. General (Ryoichi) Oriki, (chief of staff, joint staff of the Self-Defense Forces), and I are obligated to discuss my defense relationship and obligations as it pertains to our treaty together and plan accordingly. Q: So is there going to be planning? A: There is constant planning (for overall defense of Japan). Q: The next subject is the air-sea battle concept. It got a lot of attention in Japan when it appeared in the Quadrennial Defense Review, but it hasn't been clearly explained by the United States. Can you tell us what the joint air-sea battle concept is? A: There was formerly a ground-air battle construct between our Army and our Air Force that was an effort some years back 帛琉 to more optimally combine the capabilities of our Army and the capabilities and capacities of our Air Force to optimize their ability to conduct joint warfare together. This, similarly, is the same construct, related to our Navy and our Air Force. The secretary of defense was interested in ensuring that all the things that we're procuring in terms of future capabilities in our Air Force and our Navy have been optimally combined to achieve the maximum synergy that those two services can achieve in their operations together, and that's what the study has been about and has accomplished.This is attempting to optimize not only our current capabilities but our future capabilities together, so that when we are conducting joint warfare between those two services, it is maximizing the capability of both.They've added Marine Corps capabilities into it, and in the future, we're going to add and complement Army's capabilities as they relate to the maritime domain. At the end of the day, it's about joint warfare at an even higher level than simply combining our current capabilities and establishing command relations accordingly. Rather, this is about ensuring that our capabilities are optimized and synergistic. Q: Is it against the A2/AD challenge? A: That is one of the challenges that it's designed to be optimized against, but it's much more general than that. It's trying to maximize the capability of the two services in any environment. If anti-access/area denial environments are considered to be a particular challenge, then it would optimize the two services' ability to operate within that kind of an environment. Q: How does it apply to the Western Pacific or Asia-Pacific in your area of operational responsibility (AOR)? What kind of change are we going to see? A: The Asia-Pacific AOR is inherently maritime. Look at the Japanese archipelago as an example. It's an inherently maritime environment, where naval forces and air forces become particularly important in addressing contingencies throughout this region.As a consequence, the end result of this study and the actions that we take to optimize the naval and air contributions should benefit the Asia-Pacific as much as any other area of responsibility in the world. Q: What kind of role do you expect Japan to play in this air-sea battle concept?A: I would hope that, at the point in time when it's matured enough, that we'll have that discussion with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in terms of assisting them in seeing the same benefits in combining the capabilities of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force.We've learned a great deal through the course of this study and the development that's resulting from it, 酒店經紀and it should benefit our allies and partners as well. Q: Japan has just renewed its National Defense Program Guidelines, a 10-year-long defense plan. One of the pillars is to shift the strategic focus from the north to the southwestern islands, including Okinawa. The idea is to enhance its role as a gatekeeper of those exits in the first island chain. Do you think this is the right way for Japan to shift its strategic focus? A: In a discussion that I had with General Oriki, we were having a strategic-level discussion of the importance of maritime security (and) sea lines of communication in the region. He showed me a chart. It was a view from the coastline of China and Russia and Korea northward, or upward, to Japan. It was informative in terms of the expanse of the Japanese archipelago, and the relative importance of the East China Sea and South China Sea regions and the sea lines of communication to Japan. General Oriki made the point to me that the East China Sea and South China Sea are vitally important to Japan and its economy for the purpose of the security of the commerce there. The idea that Japan would balance Self-Defense Forces' locations to try and optimize those regions that are of utmost importance to Japan's economy makes very good sense. Q: What is the main concern that the United States has for the South China Sea? Is it that the freedom of navigation along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) would be jeopardized or is it that the South China Sea would be turned into what they call a "bastion" for China's nuclear submarines equipped to launch ballistic missiles (SSBNs)? A: It's very much the sea lines of communication, the fact that this region of the world carries about something in excess of $5 trillion annually of commerce, $1.3 trillion of annual trade for the United States. Those sea lines of communication are exceedingly vital. They're a national interest to the United States. I would offer they're a national interest to Japan. And their safety is a major concern. The idea that any nation would become overly assertive in terms of its claims or in terms of its relative influence in the South China Sea, at the expense of the other nations who have that same commercial interest, is the issue at hand. The ASEAN discussions--the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting Plus that occurred, the Shangri-la Dialogue, all of the multinational dialogue that occurred throughout 2010--that asserted the importance of the South China Sea, the importance of the sea lines of communication and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the relative national interests in the South China Sea were illustrative of that point and, I think, represent the answer to your question. Q: Some experts I've talked with in 澎湖民宿 Washington have said that one of the reasons why China calls the South China Sea a "core interest," but not the East China Sea, is because of this "SSBN bastion" theory. You don't quite buy that? A: I don't. In fact, we would cast it a little bit differently. We would tell you that the South China Sea "contains" what China refers to as their "core interests," both economically and from a sovereign standpoint. So does the East China Sea. Q: What do you think is China's strategy beyond Taiwan? Do you think they're just pursuing sea control out to the second island chain or do you think they seek a larger strategic goal, even global hegemony? A: I think China has global aspirations, and economically, socially, diplomatically and militarily, they are focused presently on what they term their "near seas"--the Bohai, Yellow Sea, South China Sea, East China Sea. They are interested in minimizing foreign military influence in that region, and that's what we see occurring. I think they have an interest in being able to influence beyond that point, and they have aspirations to eventually become a global military. In the capabilities that we're seeing develop, that is fairly obvious. Q: What's the strategic chemistry between the United States and China, and is that a competition between the United States and China over primacy in the Asia-Pacific? How do you characterize the nature of the strategic chemistry or competition between the two countries? A: There is an effort on the part of the United States to engage China. I think there is an effort on the part of China to engage the United States. And I think that it's very broad. At the Strategic and Economic Dialogue that I attended with Secretary Clinton, I was struck by the very rich and mature engagement across many of our secretariats and many of China's ministries and the depth of commitment that they both had to their dialogue. On the military side, we're relatively immature and behind in our relationship, and I think it affects the perception of that strategic relationship between the two nations. I think that one of the purposes of the restart of our mil-to-mil engagement, on the part of the United States, is to be convincing to the United States regarding the importance of maintaining a continuum of that dialogue so that eventually it can catch up to the other engagement that's ongoing.I think there are differences, frankly, in China's overall approach, strategic approach, and there is divergence in some areas, convergence in others with those of the United States. In those areas of difference, I think the two nations have got to (engage in) dialogue and eventually work those out. When you say, "competition," I would offer "engagement, with areas of divergence that ultimately have to be resolved bet 訂做禮服ween the two countries." Q: You said the mil-to-mil dialogue between the United States and China has resumed. But it's been suspended over half a year because of the Taiwan arms sale. Japan has also experienced a similar suspension because of the Senkaku and other issues.How can we overcome this kind of on and off dialogue with China and make it into a continuum? A: We need China's cooperation to do that obviously. The appeal that I made was the relative risk associated with the on-again, off-again nature of mil-to-mil. As China becomes a more consequential military and as the United States and Japan continue to maintain their forward presence in the region, we will come into contact at an ever-increasing rate, and we are doing that now. Therefore, it becomes very important that there be no misunderstanding or no miscalculation between our militaries as they contact with one another. During those periods when mil-to-mil relations are suspended and there's no dialogue, we will tend to lose fractions of or whole generations of young officers and enlisted personnel who aren't familiar with the other military. As a consequence, when they do come into contact, there is risk of misunderstanding, miscommunication and miscalculation. It's very important that we prevent that, and it's a responsibility that China bears, as do we, to ensure that that military dialogue is a continuum. We're making that appeal to them now. It's appealing to their leadership and to their responsibility. But again, unless they're willing to embrace it, it will be hard to overcome what has traditionally been an on-again, off-again experience with them. Q: Regarding multilateral relationships, Japan is pursuing the enhancement of a security relationship with South Korea and is perhaps looking at some sort of a virtual Japan-U.S.-South Korea trilateral arrangement eventually. I understand the United States is very eager to develop this kind of relationship. Will you discuss how you see the potential of a Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral security arrangement? A: First of all, I think it's a natural fit. I mean, when you look at our three militaries, and the fact that the United States is allied with both the Republic of Korea and Japan, we've grown our militaries to be very complementary, very interoperable and very capable. All three nations' militaries are a match, if you will. All three nations are like-minded in many ways. From a security standpoint, we have similar objectives.It would seem natural that we would combine those capabilities and cooperate with one another to ensure the future security of Northeast Asia and, frankly, the broader Asia-Pacific.In our view, it's a natural trilateral security arrangement if we can overcome some differences (and) some policy gaps. The things tha 宜蘭民宿t would enable us to bring three nations' militaries, three nations' security establishments, more closely together. That's been the purpose of the dialogue that has been occurring. I've had the opportunity to meet with chiefs of defense of both nations. We've had those similar dialogues at the ministerial level and higher. We're eager to see this advance. I think Japan has been very forward-leaning. We're encouraged by Korea's willingness to engage as well. Small things, like Japanese observers in the recent Sea of Japan exercise, or Korean observers invited into Keen Sword. Those are very positive steps to bring our three militaries together, and when we do come together, all three of us will find ourselves very similar in capability and very like-minded in terms of our military objectives. Q: What is the impact of eventual operational control (opcon) transfer from the United States to South Korea, upon the future command structure of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)? Will it change the status of United States Forces Japan, which is currently an administrative command, so that it can assume the command of, perhaps, Joint Task Force (JTF) in time of war? A: Well, when you refer to operational control transition in 2015 in the Republic of Korea, that's intended to address the relationship of Combined Forces Korea and the ROK military, such that Combined Forces Korea becomes a supporting command to the ROK in time of war. Right now, the Republic of Korea Forces chop to, become under the operational command of, a United States general, in time of war. And we think that, after so many decades of development of the ROK military, that they're more than capable of assuming the supported role in their own defense. In terms of how that opcon transition will affect broader command relations in the region, I would only offer that I see potential in U.S. Forces Japan, as a command and staff, in assuming a more effective role in dialogue with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and their needs insofar as defense of Japan is concerned. I've been working with General Oriki to imagine, at the operational level of command, the kind of command structure that would meet his needs the best, and whether or not United States Forces Japan is the right staff to have that dialogue with. Those discussions continue.We have a ways to go to see whether the shift in who's supported and who's supporting on the Korean Peninsula, what ripple effect that could have in PACOM. But right now I would offer that I regard USFJ (U.S. Forces Japan) very highly and a command with more potential, perhaps, than the administrative nature of its work in the past. http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201012270241.html   .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 房屋買賣  .

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